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1 
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 
PROTECTION OF PERSONS IN THE EVENT OF DISASTERS AND OTHER TOPICS: 
THE SIXTY-EIGHTH SESSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 
By Sean D. Murphy

The International Law Commission held its sixty-eighth session in Geneva from May 2 to 
June 10, and from July 4 to August 12, 2016, under the chairmanship of Pedro Comissário 
Afonso (Mozambique).
1
 Notably, the Commission completed on second reading a full set of
eighteen draft articles with commentary on the protection of persons in the event of disasters and 
recommended to the United Nations General Assembly that it elaborate a convention based on 
the draft articles.  
 Additionally, the Commission adopted on first reading a complete set of draft 
conclusions, with commentary, for two topics: identification of customary international law; and 
subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties. As 
such, both topics might be completed by the Commission on second reading in 2018. 
Progress was also made in developing draft articles on crimes against humanity; draft 
guidelines on protection of the atmosphere; draft conclusions on jus cogens; and draft principles 
on protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts. The Commission commenced a 
debate on a proposed draft article on “limitations and exceptions” to the immunity of state 
officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, but, due to insufficient time, the debate will continue 
in 2017. Furthermore, an additional proposed guideline on the provisional application of treaties 
was sent to the drafting committee. The Commission decided to add two new topics to its long-
term work program: the settlement of international disputes to which international organizations 
are parties; and succession of states in respect of state responsibility. 
I. PROTECTION OF PERSONS IN THE EVENT OF DISASTERS 
In 2008, the Commission commenced work on the topic of the protection of persons in 
the event of disasters and thereafter was guided by eight reports submitted by the special 
rapporteur, Eduardo Valencia-Ospina (Colombia).
2
 As a general matter, the topic seeks to set

 Patricia Roberts Harris Research Professor of Law, George Washington University, and member of the UN 
International Law Commission. 
1
 See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Sixty-Eighth Session, UN GAOR, 71st Sess., 
Supp. No. 10, at 2, para. 3, UN Doc. A/71/10 (Sept. 19, 2016) [hereinafter 2016 Report]. This report and other ILC 
documents are available online at http://legal.un.org/ilc. In addition, UN documents are generally available online at 
https://documents.un.org/prod/ods.nsf/home.xsp. 
2
 International Law Commission, Eighth Report on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/697 (Mar. 17, 2016) (prepared by Special Rapporteur Eduardo Valencia-Ospina). For discussion of prior 
2 
 
forth relevant principles and rules of international law applicable with respect to a disaster, 
defined as “a calamitous event or series of events resulting in widespread loss of life, great 
human suffering and distress, mass displacement, or large-scale material or environmental 
damage, thereby seriously disrupting the functioning of society.”3  
 
During the sixty-eighth session, the Commission completed on second reading a full set 
of eighteen draft articles, with commentaries, on this topic.
4
 To accompany the draft articles, the 
Commission adopted a preamble, containing a final clause that sets the tone for the draft articles 
by stressing the sovereignty of states, but at the same time reaffirming that with such sovereignty 
comes the “the primary role of the State affected by a disaster in providing disaster relief 
assistance.”5 The draft articles then proceed to identify various duties for such states and for 
those entities in a position to assist them. 
 
The preamble notes the role of the General Assembly in encouraging the progressive 
development of international law and its codification in relation to disasters. The Commission’s 
commentary to that clause indicates that it “serves, at the outset, to highlight the fact that the 
draft articles contain elements of both progressive development and codification of international 
law.”6 Thereafter, however, the commentary does not distinguish between those elements that 
are progressive development and those that are codification, such that it remains unspecified as 
to what extent the draft articles are intended to restate customary international law or, instead, to 
advance the preferences of the Commission as to what the law should be.  
 
Perhaps due to a belief that significant aspects of the draft articles represent progressive 
development of the law, the Commission recommended, in accordance with Article 23 of its 
Statute,
7
 that the General Assembly elaborate a convention on the basis of the draft articles.
8
 
Whether the General Assembly will do so depends on many factors, including whether states 
(particularly states typically involved in transnational relief operations) are willing to assume or 
acknowledge the “duties” set forth in the draft articles. The written and oral comments received 
by the Commission from states based on the outcome of the first reading of the draft articles 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
work on these draft articles, see Sean D. Murphy, The Expulsion of Aliens and Other Topics: The Sixty-Fourth 
Session of the International Law Commission, 107 AJIL 164, 168–69 (2013) [hereinafter Murphy, Sixty-Fourth 
Session]; Sean D. Murphy, Immunity Ratione Personae of Foreign Government Officials and Other Topics: The 
Sixty-Fifth Session of the International Law Commission, 108 AJIL 41, 51–52 (2014) [hereinafter Murphy, Sixty-
Fifth Session]; Sean D. Murphy, The Expulsion of Aliens (Revisited) and Other Topics: The Sixty-Sixth Session of 
the International Law Commission, 109 AJIL 125, 132–35 (2015) [hereinafter Murphy, Sixty-Sixth Session]; Sean D. 
Murphy, Identification of Customary International Law and Other Topics: The Sixty-Seventh Session of the 
International Law Commission, 109 AJIL 822, 843–44 (2015) [hereinafter Murphy, Sixty-Seventh Session]. 
3
 2016 Report, supra note 1, at 21 (draft Article 3(a)). 
4
 Id. at 17–73, para. 49. 
5
 Id. at 17, pmbl. 
6
 Id. at 17–18. 
7
 Statute of the International Law Commission, Art. 23, GA Res. 174 (II) (Nov. 21, 1947). 
8
 2016 Report, supra note 1, at 13, para. 46. 
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suggest various important concerns, not all of which were addressed by the Commission at the 
second reading.  
 
For example, draft Article 7 on the “duty to cooperate” provides that “States shall, as 
appropriate, cooperate among themselves, with the United Nations, with the components of the 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and with other assisting actors.”9 After the first reading, 
many states expressed concern as to whether such a “duty to cooperate” existed under 
international law. For example, Greece noted that the use of mandatory language in the form of 
“shall” was not supported by state practice,10 a concern echoed by the Nordic states11 and 
Austria.
12
 The Russian Federation maintained that the duty in the draft article was not a well-
established principle of international law.
13
 The United Kingdom viewed that recourse to 
“‘rights’ and ‘duties’ used in the draft articles” was at odds with the voluntary nature of the 
principle of cooperation.
14
 Whether the Commission’s commentary ultimately helps to persuade 
states to accept or acknowledge such a duty remains to be seen. The commentary to draft Article 
7 relies in part on provisions concerning general interstate cooperation, such as those contained 
in the UN Charter
15
 and in the General Assembly’s 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations,16 but 
those instruments do not speak directly to disaster relief operations or to cooperation with 
nonstate actors. The commentary also relies on the General Assembly’s 1991 resolution 
“Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United 
Nations,” but that resolution uses “should” rather than “shall” when speaking of such 
cooperation.
17
 
 
Likewise, draft Article 9, paragraph 1, advances a duty to reduce the risk of disasters: 
“Each State shall reduce the risk of disasters by taking appropriate measures, including through 
legislation and regulations, to prevent, mitigate, and prepare for disasters.”18 This language, too, 
elicited negative reactions from many states who disputed that international law obliges states to 
reduce the risk of disasters. For example, France,
19
 the Republic of Korea,
20
 and the United 
                                                          
9
 Id. at 53. 
10
 UN GAOR, 67th Sess., 19th mtg. at 10, para. 58, UN Doc. A/C.6/67/SR.19 (Dec. 4, 2012).  
11
 UN GAOR, 67th Sess., 18th mtg. at 9, para. 53,UN Doc. A/C.6/67/SR.18 (Dec. 4, 2012). 
12
 Id. at 14, para. 88. 
13
 UN GAOR, 68th Sess., 25th mtg. at 8, para. 38, UN Doc. A/C.6/68/SR.25 (Dec. 2, 2013). 
14
 UN Doc. A/C.6/67/SR.19, supra note 10, para. 65. 
15
 UN Charter, Arts. 1(3), 55, 56. 
16
 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in 
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res. 2625 (XXV), annex (Oct. 24, 1970). 
17
 Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United Nations, GA Res. 
46/182, annex, para. 5 (Dec. 19, 1991) (“The magnitude and duration of many emergencies may be beyond the 
response capacity of many affected countries. International cooperation to address emergency situations and to 
strengthen the response capacity of affected countries is thus of great importance. Such cooperation should be 
provided in accordance with international law and national laws. Intergovernmental and non-governmental 
organizations working impartially and with strictly humanitarian motives should continue to make a significant 
contribution in supplementing national efforts.”). 
18
 2016 Report, supra note 1, at 42. 
19
 UN GAOR, 68th Sess., 17th mtg. at 19, para. 113, UN Doc. A/C.6/68/SR.17 (Nov. 8, 2013). 
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States
21
 all said that there is no general obligation under international law to take measures to 
prevent, mitigate, and prepare for disasters, while Austria even asserted that this issue exceeded 
the Commission’s mandate for work on this topic.22 Still other states, such as Australia23 and 
South Africa,
24
 expressed concerns as to whether states had the capacity or resources to take such 
measures, leading the Russian Federation to propose that a qualifier of “within their capacity” be 
added.
25
 The Russian Federation also proposed that this draft article be framed instead as a 
recommendation,
26
 but the Commission chose not to do so.  
 
Draft Article 10, paragraph 1, provides that the “affected State has the duty to ensure the 
protection of persons and provision of disaster relief assistance in its territory, or in territory 
under its jurisdiction or control.”27 The Commission’s commentary asserts that this “duty” is 
premised on “the core principle of sovereignty,” meaning that the state’s entitlement to 
sovereignty carries with it certain obligations to persons within its territory.
28
 The commentary 
notes that the “Commission considered that the term ‘duty’ was more appropriate than the term 
‘responsibility,’ which could be misunderstood given its use in other contexts.”29 In this regard, 
it should be noted that the Commission had previously decided that the “responsibility to 
protect” (R2P) concept did not apply in the context of disaster relief.30 Yet, even so, not all states 
appear to agree that even such a “duty” exists; Russia maintained that, while a state has a general 
responsibility to take measures to ensure the protection of persons on its territory, it did not have 
a legal obligation to do so.
31
  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
20
 UN GAOR, 68th Sess., 24th mtg. at 14, para. 91, UN Doc. A/C.6/68/SR.24 (Nov. 20, 2013). 
21
 UN GAOR, 68th Sess., 23d mtg. at 11, para. 48, UN Doc. A/C.6/68/SR.23 (Dec. 5, 2013); UN GAOR, 69th Sess., 
20th mtg. at 19, para. 120, UN Doc. A/C.6/69/SR.20 (Nov. 10, 2014) (referring to draft Article 11, which was 
subsequently renumbered as draft Article 9). 
22
 UN Doc. A/C.6/68/SR.23, supra note 21, at 14, para. 63. Austria appears to have interpreted the original mandate 
as focusing only on post-disaster responses and not on pre-disaster measures relating to prevention, mitigation, and 
preparation. 
23
 Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, Comments and Observations Received from Governments and 
International Organizations, at 38, UN Doc. A/CN.4/696 (Mar. 14, 2016).  
24
 UN Doc. A/C.6/68/SR.24, supra note 20, at 3, para. 15. 
25
 UN Doc. A/C.6/68/SR.25, supra note 13, at 8, para. 41 (referring to draft Article 16, which was subsequently 
renumbered as draft Article 9); UN GAOR, 69th Sess., 19th mtg. at 14, para. 105, UN Doc. A/C.6/69/SR.19 (Nov. 
17, 2014). 
26
 UN Doc. A/C.6/68/SR.25, supra note 13, at 8, para. 41; UN Doc. A/C.6/69/SR.19, supra note 25, at 14, para. 105. 
27
 2016 Report, supra note 1, at 50 (draft Article 10(1)). 
28
 Id. at 51. 
29
 Id. at 52. 
30
 See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Sixty-First Session, UN GAOR, 64th Sess., 
Supp. No. 10, at 335, para. 156, UN Doc. A/64/10 (2016) (“As regards the concept of ‘responsibility to protect,’ the 
Special Rapporteur recalled the 2009 report of the Secretary-General on implementing the responsibility to protect, 
which clarified that the concept did not apply to disaster response.”); id. at 338, para. 164 (“Agreement was 
expressed with the Special Rapporteur’s conclusions on the non-applicability of the concept of responsibility to 
protect . . . .”). 
31
 UN GAOR, 65th Sess., 23d mtg. at 9, para. 58, UN Doc. A/C.6/65/SR.23 (Dec. 1, 2010). 
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Draft Article 11 asserts that “[t]o the extent that a disaster manifestly exceeds its national 
response capacity, the affected State has the duty to seek assistance from, as appropriate, other 
States, the United Nations, and other potential assisting actors.”32 Here, too, numerous states 
rejected the idea that there was a “duty” under international law for an affected state to seek 
assistance. For example, Austria,
33
 France,
34
 Indonesia,
35
 Malaysia,
36
 Russia,
37
 and the United 
Kingdom
38
 all expressed the view that no such duty existed. Other states, including Austria,
39
 
Poland,
40
 and Russia,
41
 queried as to what would be the consequences of a breach of this duty. 
China suggested that the Commission avoid the term “duty,”42 and Iran suggested rephrasing the 
draft article to read that the affected state “should” seek assistance.43 Even so, the text remained 
essentially unchanged on second reading.
44
 
 
Draft Article 13 provides in paragraph 1 that the “provision of external assistance 
requires the consent of the affected State,” but paragraph 2 asserts that “[c]onsent to external 
assistance shall not be withheld arbitrarily.”45 Several states, in their comments to the 
Commission, rejected the idea of a legal obligation under customary international law not to 
withhold consent arbitrarily.
46
 Other states sought additional clarification on the meaning of 
“arbitrarily” and on who would determine if a state’s decision to withhold aid was arbitrary.47 
Still others worried that if the consent was withheld arbitrarily, then the draft article might be 
                                                          
32
 2016 Report, supra note 1, at 53 (draft Article 11). 
33
 UN GAOR, 66th Sess., 23d mtg. at 5, para. 23, UN Doc. A/C.6/66/SR.23 (Nov. 14, 2011). 
34
 Id. at 9, para. 38. 
35
 UN GAOR, 66th Sess., 24th mtg. at 13, para. 70,UN Doc. A/C.6/66/SR.24 (Dec. 1, 2011). 
36
 Id. at 20, para. 114. 
37
 Id. at 7, para. 37. 
38
 UN Doc. A/C.6/66/SR.23, supra note 33, at 10, para. 45. 
39
 UN Doc. A/CN.4/696, supra note 23, at 40–41 (referring to draft Article 13, which was subsequently renumbered 
as draft Article 11).  
40
 UN Doc. A/C.6/67/SR.19, supra note 10, at 12, para. 73 (referring to draft Article 10, which was subsequently 
renumbered as draft Article 11). 
41
 UN Doc. A/C.6/69/SR.19, supra note 25, at 14, para. 107. 
42
 UN Doc. A/C.6/69/SR.20, supra note 21, at 5, para. 25. 
43
 UN Doc. A/C.6/66/SR.24, supra note 35, at 10, para. 50; UN GAOR, 67th Sess., 20th mtg. at 3, para. 14, UN 
Doc. A/C.6/67/SR.20 (Dec. 7, 2012).  
44
 The text at first reading provided: “To the extent that a disaster exceeds its national response capacity, the affected 
State has the duty to seek assistance from among other States, the United Nations, other competent 
intergovernmental organizations and relevant non-governmental organizations, as appropriate.” Report of the 
International Law Commission on the Work of Its Sixty-Sixth Session, UN GAOR, 69th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 119, 
UN Doc. A/69/10 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 Report]. 
45
 2016 Report, supra note 1, at 59 (draft Article 13). 
46
 See, e.g., UN Doc. A/CN.4/696, supra note 23, at 43 (Australia) (referring to draft Article 14, which was 
subsequently renumbered as draft Article 13); UN Doc. A/C.6/66/SR.23, supra note 33, at 10, para. 42 (China) 
(referring to draft Article 11, which was subsequently renumbered as draft Article 13). 
47
 UN Doc. A/C.6/66/SR.23, supra note 33, at 8, para. 33 (Israel); UN GAOR, 66th Sess., 25th mtg. at 3, para. 10, 
UN Doc. A/C.6/66/SR.25 (Dec. 9, 2011) (Argentina) (referring to draft Article 11, which was subsequently 
renumbered as draft Article 13); UN Doc. A/C.6/67/SR.20, supra note 43, at 4, para. 20 (India). Other states sought 
clarification as to who would decide if an arbitrary refusal of consent occurred. E.g., UN GAOR, 66th Sess., 24th 
mtg. at 20, para. 118, UN Doc. A/C.6/66/SR/24 (Dec. 1, 2011) (Malaysia); UN Doc. A/C.6/66/SR.25, supra, at 4, 
para. 22 (Ireland).  
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read as allowing other states to act without the affected state’s consent,48 or at least to pass 
judgments upon the affected state.
49
 For such reasons, some states suggested that the draft article 
in some fashion be expressed as a political or moral recommendation.
50
 The text, however, 
remained unchanged on second reading. A further issue, unaddressed in this text, is whether 
disaster assistance can be provided in circumstances where the disaster has resulted in a collapse 
of the affected state’s government, such that consent is not possible. 
 
One important question not fully resolved by the text adopted at first reading concerned 
the relationship of these draft articles to other rules of international law, notably those that apply 
during an armed conflict. Treaties on the law of armed conflict contain numerous provisions that 
balance the rights and duties of a belligerent, in the specific situation of armed conflict, with 
respect to relief activities, including consignments of medical supplies, food and clothing, 
cooperation with national Red Cross and other societies, and treatment of relief personnel.
51
 
Draft Article 18 announces in paragraph 1 that the “present draft articles are without prejudice to 
other applicable rules of international law” and in paragraph 2 that they “do not apply to the 
extent that the response to a disaster is governed by the rules of international humanitarian 
law.”52 
 
II. COMPLETION OF THE FIRST READING FOR TWO TOPICS  
 
Identification of Customary International Law 
 
At the sixty-eighth session, the Commission debated the fourth report of the special 
rapporteur Michael Wood (United Kingdom) on the identification of customary international 
law.
53
 This report proposed a few revisions to the set of sixteen draft conclusions on this topic 
previously adopted by the drafting committee.
54
 Until this session, the work on this topic had 
                                                          
48
 UN Doc. A/CN.4/696, supra note 23, at 40–41 (Austria); see also id. at 44 (Germany) (“We concur that although 
the consent of the affected State shall not be withheld arbitrarily, consent is nevertheless an indispensable 
requirement for every provision of external assistance.”) (referring to draft Article 14, which was subsequently 
renumbered as draft Article 13). 
49
 UN Doc. A/C.6/66/SR.24, supra note 35, at 10, para. 52 (Iran).  
50
 See, e.g., UN Doc. A/C.6/66/SR.24, supra note 35, at 7, para. 37 (Russia). 
51
 See, e.g., Geneva Convention [No. IV] Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Arts. 23, 55, 
59–63, 109–11, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 UST 3516, 75 UNTS 287; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Arts. 69–71, June 8, 1977, 
1125 UNTS 3, 16 ILM 1391 (1977); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts, Art. 18, June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 609. 
52
 2016 Report, supra note 1, at 72 (draft Article 18). 
53
 International Law Commission, Fourth Report on Identification of Customary International Law, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/695 (Mar. 8, 2016) (prepared by Special Rapporteur Michael Wood); see also Fourth Report on 
Identification of Customary International Law, Addendum, UN Doc. A/CN.4/695/Add.1 (May 25, 2016) (extensive 
bibliography on the topic). 
54
 For discussion of prior work on these draft conclusions, see Murphy, Sixty-Fourth Session, supra note 2, at 174; 
Murphy, Sixty-Fifth Session, supra note 2, at 52–53; Murphy, Sixty-Sixth Session, supra note 2, at 140–42; Murphy, 
Sixty-Seventh Session, supra note 2, at 822–32. 
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remained in the drafting committee, without piecemeal adoption by the Commission of draft 
conclusions with commentary. As such, the Commission’s principal work on this topic during 
this session was to consider and revise the commentary proposed by Wood to the entire set of 
draft conclusions, which was done first in a specially convened working group and then in the 
plenary. The Commission subsequently adopted, on first reading, the draft conclusions with 
commentary.
55
  
 
The opening paragraphs of the commentary state: 
 
(1)  The present draft conclusions concern the methodology for identifying rules of 
customary international law. They seek to offer practical guidance on how the existence 
(or non-existence) of rules of customary international law, and their content, are to be 
determined. This matter is not only of concern to specialists in public international law; 
others, including those involved with national courts, are increasingly called upon to 
apply or advise on customary international law. Whenever doing so, a structured and 
careful process of legal analysis and evaluation is required to ensure that a rule of 
customary international law is properly identified, thus promoting the credibility of the 
particular determination. 
 
(2)  Customary international law remains an important source of public international 
law. In the international legal system, such unwritten law, deriving from practice 
accepted as law, can be an effective means for subjects of international law to regulate 
their behaviour and it is indeed often invoked by States and others. Customary 
international law is, moreover, among the sources of international law listed in Article 38, 
paragraph 1, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which refers, in 
subparagraph (b), to “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as 
law.” This wording reflects the two constituent elements of customary international law: 
a general practice and its acceptance as law (also referred to as opinio juris). 
 
(3)  The identification of customary international law is a matter on which there is a 
wealth of material, including case law and scholarly writings. The draft conclusions 
reflect the approach adopted by States, as well as by international courts and tribunals 
and within international organizations. Recognizing that the process for the identification 
of customary international law is not always susceptible to exact formulations, they aim 
to offer clear guidance without being overly prescriptive. 
 
(4)  The 16 draft conclusions that follow are divided into seven parts. Part One deals 
with scope and purpose. Part Two sets out the basic approach to the identification of 
customary international law, the “two element” approach. Parts Three and Four provide 
                                                          
55
 2016 Report, supra note 1, at 80–117. 
8 
 
further guidance on the two constituent elements of customary international law, which 
also serve as the criteria for its identification, “a general practice” and “acceptance as 
law” (opinio juris). Part Five addresses certain categories of materials that are frequently 
invoked in the identification of rules of customary international law. Parts Six and Seven 
deal with two exceptional cases: the persistent objector; and particular customary 
international law (being rules of customary international law that apply only among a 
limited number of States).
56
 
 
 Having completed the first reading on this topic, the Commission will now wait for 
comments from states and others, with a likely second reading in 2018.
57
 Those comments may 
provide interesting insights into the views of states with respect to the following topics: the “two-
element” approach; the role of specially affected states; inaction as a form of state practice (and 
evidence of acceptance as law); the role of international organizations, as such, when identifying 
customary international law; the effects of treaties or resolutions of international organizations 
when identifying customary international law; the persistent-objector rule; and particular 
(regional or “special”) customary international law. In the meantime, the Commission has 
“requested the Secretariat to prepare a memorandum on ways and means for making the 
evidence of customary international law more readily available, which would survey the present 
state of the evidence of customary international law and make suggestions for its 
improvement.”58  
 
Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to the Interpretation of Treaties 
 
The topic of “subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to the 
interpretation of treaties,” originally considered by a study group of the Commission within the 
broader topic “Treaties over Time,” is now being addressed through a special rapporteur, Georg 
Nolte (Germany).
59
 Under his guidance, the Commission has developed thirteen draft 
conclusions on the use of subsequent agreements and subsequent practice as a means of treaty 
interpretation, based on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).
60
 
  
                                                          
56
 Id. at 79–80 (footnotes omitted). 
57
 For comments already received from states, see International Law Commission, Analytical Guide to the Work of 
the International Law Commission, Identification of Customary International Law (Aug. 16, 2016), at 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/1_13.shtml. 
58
 2016 Report, supra note 1, at 75, para. 56. 
59
 For discussion of prior work on this topic, see Murphy, Sixty-Fourth Session, supra note 2, at 176; Murphy, Sixty-
Fifth Session, supra note 2, at 48–51; Murphy, Sixty-Sixth Session, supra note 2, at 136–38; Murphy, Sixty-Seventh 
Session, supra note 2, at 836–38. 
60
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, 8 ILM 679 (1969) [hereinafter 
VCLT]. 
9 
 
At the sixty-eighth session, the Commission first focused on the adoption of what was 
later numbered as draft Conclusion 13, based on a proposal in the fourth report of the special 
rapporteur.
61
 This draft conclusion, “Pronouncements of Expert Treaty Bodies,” states: 
 
1.  For the purposes of these draft conclusions, an expert treaty body is a body 
consisting of experts serving in their personal capacity, which is established under a 
treaty and is not an organ of an international organization. 
 
2.  The relevance of a pronouncement of an expert treaty body for the interpretation 
of a treaty is subject to the applicable rules of the treaty. 
 
3.  A pronouncement of an expert treaty body may give rise to, or refer to, a 
subsequent agreement or subsequent practice by parties under article 31, paragraph 3, or 
other subsequent practice under article 32. Silence by a party shall not be presumed to 
constitute subsequent practice under article 31, paragraph 3 (b), accepting an 
interpretation of a treaty as expressed in a pronouncement of an expert treaty body. 
 
4.  This draft conclusion is without prejudice to the contribution that a 
pronouncement of an expert treaty body may otherwise make to the interpretation of a 
treaty.
62
 
 
Paragraph 3 is the core aspect of this draft conclusion. In its commentary to this 
paragraph, the Commission explains: 
 
(9)  A pronouncement of an expert treaty body cannot as such constitute subsequent 
practice under article 31, paragraph 3 (b), since this provision requires a subsequent 
practice of the parties that establishes their agreement regarding the interpretation of the 
treaty. This has been confirmed, for example, by the reaction to a draft proposition of the 
Human Rights Committee according to which its own “general body of jurisprudence,” 
or the acquiescence by States to that jurisprudence, would constitute subsequent practice 
under article 31, paragraph 3 (b). The proposition of the Human Rights Committee was: 
 
“In relation to the general body of jurisprudence generated by the 
Committee, it may be considered that it constitutes ‘subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding 
                                                          
61
 2016 Report, supra note 1, at 119, para. 70 (citing International Law Commission, Fourth Report on Subsequent 
Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to the Interpretation of Treaties, at 5–36, paras. 10–94, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/694 (Mar. 7, 2016) (prepared by Special Rapporteur Georg Nolte)). The fourth report’s original proposal for 
this draft conclusion was numbered draft Conclusion 12. The fourth report also proposed a draft Conclusion 13 on 
“decisions of domestic courts,” which ultimately was not referred to the drafting committee. 
62
 Id. at 123 (draft Article 13). 
10 
 
its interpretation’ within the sense of article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, or, alternatively, the acquiescence of States parties in those 
determinations constitutes such practice.” 
 
(10)  When this proposition was criticized by some States, the Committee did not 
pursue its proposal and adopted its general comment No. 33 without a reference to article 
31, paragraph 3 (b). This confirms that pronouncements of expert treaty bodies cannot as 
such constitute subsequent practice under article 31, paragraph 3 (b). 
 
(11)  Pronouncements of expert treaty bodies may, however, give rise to, or refer to, a 
subsequent agreement or a subsequent practice by the parties which establish their 
agreement regarding the interpretation of the treaty under article 31, paragraph 3 (a) or 
(b). This possibility has been recognized by States, by the Commission and also by the 
International Law Association and by a significant number of authors. There is indeed no 
reason why a subsequent agreement between the parties or subsequent practice that 
establishes the agreement of the parties themselves regarding the interpretation of a treaty 
could not arise from, or be referred to by, a pronouncement of an expert treaty body. 
 
(12)  Whereas a pronouncement of an expert treaty body can, in principle, give rise to a 
subsequent agreement or a subsequent practice by the parties themselves under article 31, 
paragraph 3 (a) and (b), this result is not easily achieved in practice. Most treaties that 
establish expert treaty bodies at the universal level have many parties. It will often be 
difficult to establish that all parties have accepted, explicitly or implicitly, that a 
particular pronouncement of an expert treaty body expresses a particular interpretation of 
the treaty.
63
  
 
The commentary then proceeds to provide some examples illustrating this phenomenon and 
emphasizes why acceptance of a treaty interpretation should not be presumed from the silence by 
states parties after a pronouncement by an expert treaty body.
64
 
  
Paragraph 4 of draft Conclusion 13 indicates that the draft conclusion is “without 
prejudice to the contribution that a pronouncement of an expert treaty body may otherwise make 
to the interpretation of a treaty.”65 The commentary explains that some members considered the 
pronouncements of expert treaty bodies as a form of practice that may contribute to the 
interpretation of a treaty, while others considered any such pronouncements were not “a form of 
practice” in the sense of the present topic.66  
 
                                                          
63
 2016 Report, supra note 1, at 233–34 (footnotes omitted). 
64
 Id. at 234–37. 
65
 Id. at 229. 
66
 Id. at 239–40.  
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Having completed work on draft Conclusion 13, the Commission then revisited all the 
draft conclusions and commentary so as to adopt them on first reading.
67
 The Commission now 
awaits comments from states and others, with a likely second reading in 2018. 
 
III. OTHER TOPICS ADDRESSED DURING THE SIXTY-EIGHTH SESSION 
 
Crimes Against Humanity 
 
 The Commission commenced work on the topic of crimes against humanity in 2014, 
appointing Sean D. Murphy (United States; the present author) as special rapporteur.
68
 The 
syllabus for the topic provides that the objective is “to draft articles for what would become a 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Humanity.”69 At the sixty-
seventh session, the Commission approved four draft articles with commentary.
70
 At the sixty-
eighth session, the Commission debated the special rapporteur’s second report71 and then 
referred six further draft articles—draft Articles 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10—to the drafting committee. 
Ultimately, the Commission approved these six draft articles with commentaries.
72
 
 
Draft Article 5 sets forth various measures that each state must take under its criminal 
law to ensure that crimes against humanity, as such, constitute offenses, including instances 
when a natural person commits, attempts to commit, assists in, or contributes to a crime against 
humanity.
73
 The draft article also obligates states to ensure that command or superior 
responsibility exists with respect to crimes against humanity,
74
 in terms almost identical to those 
found in Rome Statute Article 28.
75
 Further, draft Article 5 precludes the use of any superior 
orders defense or any statute of limitation and requires states to provide for appropriate penalties 
commensurate with the grave nature of such crimes.
76
 Finally, draft Article 5 also provides that 
“[s]ubject to the provisions of its national law, each State shall take measures, where appropriate, 
                                                          
67
 Id. at 123–240, para. 76. 
68
 2014 Report, supra note 44, at 265, para. 266. For discussion of prior work on these draft articles, see Murphy, 
Sixty-Seventh Session, supra note 2, at 835–36. 
69
 See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Sixty-Fifth Session, UN GAOR, 68th Sess., 
Supp. No. 10, at 140, para. 3 (Annex B), UN Doc. A/68/10 (2013). 
70
 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Sixty-Seventh Session, UN GAOR, 70th Sess., 
Supp. No. 10, at 50–52, UN Doc. A/70/10 (2015). 
71
 International Law Commission, Second Report on Crimes Against Humanity, UN Doc. A/CN.4/690 (Jan. 21, 
2016) (prepared by Special Rapporteur Sean Murphy) [hereinafter Second Report on Crimes Against Humanity]. 
72
 2016 Report, supra note 1, at 242, paras. 82, 83; see also id. at 246–80, para. 85. 
73
 Id. at 247 (draft Article 5(1)–(2)). 
74
 Id. (draft Article 5(3)). 
75
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 28, July 17, 1998, 2187 UNTS 90. 
76
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to establish the liability of legal persons for the offences referred to in this draft article[;] . . . 
such liability of legal persons may be criminal, civil or administrative.”77 
 
Following the same approach as many treaties addressing crimes, draft Article 6 provides 
that each state must establish, in certain cases, jurisdiction over the offenses referred to in draft 
Article 5.
78
 Those cases include situations when the crime occurs in territory under that state’s 
jurisdiction, when it has been committed by one of its nationals, or when the offender is present 
in territory under the state’s jurisdiction. 
 
Draft Article 7 focuses on steps to be taken by a state when such crimes may have 
occurred in its territory. It reads: “Each State shall ensure that its competent authorities proceed 
to a prompt and impartial investigation whenever there is reasonable ground to believe that acts 
constituting crimes against humanity have been or are being committed in any territory under its 
jurisdiction.”79 As the commentary to this draft article explains,80 a comparable obligation 
features in some treaties addressing crimes, such as in Article 12 of the Convention Against 
Torture.
81
 
 
Draft Article 8 provides for certain preliminary measures to be taken by the state in the 
territory under whose jurisdiction an alleged offender is present.
82
 First, it calls upon the state to 
“take the person into custody or take other legal measures to ensure his or her presence,” in 
accordance with that state’s law, but “only for such time as is necessary to enable any criminal, 
extradition, or surrender proceedings to be instituted.”83 Second, it requires the state immediately 
to “make a preliminary inquiry into the facts.”84 Third, it provides that the state shall also 
immediately notify the states able to exercise jurisdiction pursuant to draft Article 6 of the 
measures that it has taken and indicate whether the state itself intends to exercise jurisdiction. 
Doing so allows those other states to consider whether they wish to exercise jurisdiction, in 
which case they might seek extradition of the alleged offender.
85
 
 
Draft Article 9, entitled “Aut dedere aut judicare,” provides: 
 
                                                          
77
 Id. at 248 (draft Article 5(7)). This provision is modeled on Article 3(4) of the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, May 25, 
2000, 2171 UNTS 227. 
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 2016 Report, supra note 1, at 265–66 (draft Article 6). 
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 Id. at 269 (draft Article 7). 
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 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Art. 12, Dec. 10, 
1984, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 UNTS 85 (“Each State Party shall ensure that its competent 
authorities proceed to a prompt and impartial investigation, wherever there is reasonable ground to believe that an 
act of torture has been committed in any territory under its jurisdiction.”). 
82
 2016 Report, supra note 1, at 271 (draft Article 8). 
83
 Id.  
84
 Id.  
85
 Id. at 271–72. 
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The State in the territory under whose jurisdiction the alleged offender is present shall 
submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, unless it 
extradites or surrenders the person to another State or competent international criminal 
tribunal. Those authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of 
any other offence of a grave nature under the law of that State.
86
 
 
This language envisages the possibility of a state satisfying its aut dedere aut judicare obligation 
by surrendering the alleged offender to an international criminal tribunal, such as the 
International Criminal Court. In some instances, the state may be obligated to so surrender the 
alleged offender, depending on the state’s legal relationship with the international criminal 
tribunal; to the extent that the state has no legal obligation with respect to such a tribunal, the 
state remains obligated to submit the case to its competent authorities, unless it extradites the 
person to another state.
87
 
 
 Draft Article 10 addresses the rights of the alleged offender.
88
 Paragraph 1 asserts that 
such persons “shall be guaranteed at all stages of the proceedings fair treatment, including a fair 
trial, and full protection of his or her rights under applicable national and international law, 
including human rights law.” Paragraph 2 provides that when the person is in prison, custody, or 
detention by a state that is not of his or her nationality, the person is entitled to communicate 
without delay with a representative of his or her state, to be visited by such a representative, and 
to be informed without delay of his or her rights in this regard. 
 
 In his second report, the special rapporteur indicated that a third report on this topic could 
address issues such as (1) rights and obligations applicable to the extradition of the alleged 
offender; (2) rights and obligations applicable to mutual legal assistance in connection with 
criminal proceedings; (3) the obligation of nonrefoulement in certain circumstances; (4) dispute 
settlement and monitoring mechanisms; and (5) conflict avoidance with treaties such as the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
89
  
 
Protection of the Atmosphere 
 
 The Commission considered the third report on the protection of the atmosphere by the 
special rapporteur, Shinya Murase (Japan).
90
 Based on that report, the Commission adopted a 
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 Id. at 273 (draft Article 9). 
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 Id. at 276–77 (draft Article 10). 
89
 Second Report on Crimes Against Humanity, supra note 71, at 100, para. 202. 
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preambular paragraph as well as five new draft guidelines—draft Guidelines 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7—
with commentary.
91
  
 
 Draft Guideline 3 asserts that “States have the obligation to protect the atmosphere by 
exercising due diligence in taking appropriate measures, in accordance with applicable rules of 
international law, to prevent, reduce or control atmospheric pollution and atmospheric 
degradation.”92 According to the commentary, this draft guideline is “central to the present draft 
guidelines” and from it flow draft Guidelines 4, 5, and 6.93 Draft Guideline 4 indicates that 
“States have the obligation to ensure that an environmental impact assessment is undertaken of 
proposed activities under their jurisdiction or control which are likely to cause significant 
adverse impact on the atmosphere in terms of atmospheric pollution or atmospheric 
degradation.” 94 Draft Guideline 5 provides that “utilization [of the atmosphere] should be 
undertaken in a sustainable manner,” noting that “[s]ustainable utilization of the atmosphere 
includes the need to reconcile economic development with protection of the atmosphere.”95 Draft 
Guideline 6 maintains that the “atmosphere should be utilized in an equitable and reasonable 
manner, taking into account the interests of present and future generations.”96 
 
 Draft Guideline 7 relates: “Activities aimed at intentional large-scale modification of the 
atmosphere should be conducted with prudence and caution, subject to any applicable rules of 
international law.”97 By its terms, this guideline addresses both activities designed to use the 
atmosphere for beneficial purposes, such as weather modification to improve crops, and 
activities designed to improve the atmosphere itself, such as through removing carbon from the 
atmosphere and sequestering it in the soil or marine environment.
98
 The latter type of activity, 
sometimes referred to as “geo-engineering,” involves new techniques that many regard as 
potentially harmful to the environment of the lithosphere.
99
 Given that the draft guidelines might 
be viewed as authorizing such activities, the commentary to this draft guideline notes:  
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 2016 Report, supra note 1, at 282, para. 93. 
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 Id. at 286 (draft Guideline 3). 
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 Id. at 288–89 (draft Guideline 4). 
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 Id. at 291 (draft Guideline 5). 
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 Id. at 292 (draft Guideline 6). 
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 Id. at 293 (draft Guideline 7). 
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 Id. at 294. 
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no climate-related geo-engineering activities that may affect biodiversity take place, until there is an 
adequate scientific basis on which to justify such activities and appropriate consideration of the associated 
risks for the environment and biodiversity and associated social, economic and cultural impacts, with the 
exception of small scale scientific research studies that would be conducted in a controlled setting in 
accordance with Article 3 of the Convention, and only if they are justified by the need to gather specific 
scientific data and are subject to a thorough prior assessment of the potential impacts on the environment. 
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(12)  A number of members remained unpersuaded that there was a need for a draft 
guideline on this matter, which essentially remains controversial, and the discussion on it 
was evolving, and is based on scant practice. Other members were of the view that the 
draft guideline could be enhanced during second reading.
100
 
 
Jus Cogens 
 
During the sixty-seventh session, the Commission moved the topic of jus cogens onto the 
current program of work and appointed Dire D. Tladi (South Africa) as special rapporteur.
101
 In a 
first report submitted for the sixty-eighth session,
102
 the special rapporteur proposed three draft 
conclusions, two of which were referred to the drafting committee.
103
 
 
As provisionally adopted within the drafting committee, draft Conclusion 1 states: “The 
present draft conclusions concern the identification and legal effects of peremptory norms of 
general international law (jus cogens).”104 The special rapporteur also proposed two paragraphs 
for the other draft conclusion (originally designated as draft Conclusion 3) that were sent to the 
drafting committee. So far, the drafting committee has provisionally adopted just the first 
paragraph of that draft conclusion (now designated as draft Conclusion 2), which provides:  
 
 A peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens) is a norm accepted 
and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from 
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm 
of general international law having the same character.
105
  
 
This language tracks the language of the second sentence of VCLT Article 53.
106
 The second 
paragraph of this draft conclusion proposed by the special rapporteur, which has not yet been 
adopted by the drafting committee, reads: “Norms of jus cogens protect the fundamental values 
of the international community, are hierarchically superior to other norms of international law 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Convention on Biological Diversity, Tenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties, Decision X/33, Biodiversity 
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and are universally applicable.”107 That language, which does not appear in the VCLT, elicited 
conflicting views within the Commission and the drafting committee.
108
 According to the report 
of its chair, the drafting committee next year will consider “moving paragraph 2, or a further 
version thereof, into a separate draft conclusion or conclusions.”109 
 
The special rapporteur has indicated that a second report in 2017 could be dedicated to 
the rules for identifying of norms of jus cogens, including the question of the sources of jus 
cogens, “that is, whether jus cogens emanate from treaty law, customary international law, 
general principles of law or other sources.”110 Further, the second report “will also consider the 
relationship between jus cogens and non-derogation clauses in human rights treaties.”111 A third 
report in 2018 might consider the consequences of jus cogens, while a fourth report in 2019 
could address miscellaneous issues.
112
 
 
Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts 
 
 The Commission considered the third report on the protection of the environment in 
relation to armed conflicts by the special rapporteur, Marie G. Jacobsson (Sweden).
113
 While her 
first report focused on rules of international law that operate in relation to the environment even 
in the absence of armed conflict and her second report focused on rules of international law that 
apply once armed conflict breaks out, the third report addressed a mixture of rules, including 
those applicable after the armed conflict ends.  
 
 The draft principles on this topic adopted to date are at differing levels of completion, and 
the Commission will need to decide in 2017 how best to proceed given that the special 
rapporteur is not seeking reelection to the Commission. Possibilities include appointing a new 
special rapporteur or establishing a working group, as was done in 2012 on the topic of aut 
dedere aut judicare.
114
 
 
To date, the Commission has adopted introductory commentary and eight draft principles 
with commentary on the following issues: scope (draft Principle 1); purpose (draft Principle 2); 
designation of protected zones (draft Principle 5); general protection of the natural environment 
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during armed conflict (draft Principle 9); application of the law of armed conflict to the natural 
environment (draft Principle 10); environmental considerations when applying the principle of 
proportionality and the rules on military necessity (draft Principle 11); prohibition on reprisals 
(draft Principle 12); and protected zones (draft Principle 13).
115
 
 
Further, the drafting committee has provisionally adopted nine additional draft principles 
on measures to enhance the protection of the environment (draft Principle 4); protection of the 
environment of indigenous peoples (draft Principle 6); agreements concerning the presence of 
military forces in relation to armed conflict (draft Principle 7); peace operations (draft Principle 
8); peace processes (draft Principle 14); post-armed conflict environmental assessments and 
remedial measures (draft Principle 15); remnants of war (draft Principle 16); remnants of war at 
sea (draft Principle 17); and sharing and granting access to information (draft Principle 18). 
These draft principles and their commentary have not yet been adopted by the Commission.
116
 
 
Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction 
 
 The Commission had before it, towards the end of the sixty-eighth session, the fifth 
report on “immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction” by its second special 
rapporteur for this topic, Concepción Escobar Hernández (Spain).
117
 This report addresses the 
possibility of “limitations and exceptions” to such immunity118 and proposes a single draft 
article: 
 
 Draft article 7 
Crimes in respect of which immunity does not apply 
 
1.  Immunity shall not apply in relation to the following crimes: 
 
(a)  Genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, torture and enforced 
disappearances; 
 
(b)  Crimes of corruption; 
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(c) Crimes that cause harm to persons, including death and serious injury, or to 
property, when such crimes are committed in the territory of the forum State and the 
State official is present in said territory at the time that such crimes are committed. 
 
2.  Paragraph 1 shall not apply to persons who enjoy immunity ratione personae during 
their term of office. 
 
3.  Paragraphs 1 and 2 are without prejudice to: 
 
(a)  Any provision of a treaty that is binding on the forum State and the State of the 
official, under which immunity would not be applicable; 
 
(b)  The obligation to cooperate with an international tribunal which, in each case, 
requires compliance by the forum State.
119
 
 
 At the point when the Commission was scheduled to debate the fifth report, including this 
draft article, the report was available to the Commission only in two of the six official languages 
of the United Nations (Spanish and English).
120
 Nevertheless, and on an exceptional basis, the 
debate was commenced with an introduction of the report by the special rapporteur
121
 in which 
she explained that 
 
although the practice was varied, it revealed a clear trend towards considering the 
commission of international crimes as a bar to the application of the immunity ratione 
materiae of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction. This was on the basis that: 
(a) such crimes were not considered official acts, or were an exception to immunity, 
owing to the serious nature of the crime; or (b) they undermined the values and principles 
recognized by the international community as a whole.
122
 
 
The special rapporteur’s introduction was followed by interventions of those members who 
wished to speak during the sixty-eighth session, but the debate was not completed and will 
continue in the sixty-ninth session, at which time the report will be available in the six official 
languages of the United Nations.
123
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 The initial debate at the sixty-eighth session suggests that a divide may exist among the 
members of the Commission as to whether the draft article reflects lex lata or even lex 
ferenda.
124
 In the debate, 
 
[s]ome members were critical of the report for not faithfully following the analytical 
process of identification of customary international law referred to therein. Moreover, the 
conclusions that were sometimes reached were often irreconcilable with certain other 
assertions made in the report. In particular, concerns were expressed regarding the 
treatment of the case law, which was of varied origin, the choice of which appeared 
selective, the reliance in some cases on separate and dissenting opinions, as well as 
reliance on [a] limited sample of national legislation, some of which it was suggested was 
of limited relevance in the consideration of the topic. It was further noted that a trend 
towards an exception in domestic courts, even if it existed, was not a general practice for 
purposes of constituting a rule of customary international law.
125
 
 
 Part of the difficulty in reaching consensus also may derive from the methodology 
employed when analyzing state practice in this area. In that regard, several issues arise with 
respect to the methodology used in the fifth report, many of which were touched upon in the 
initial part of the Commission’s debate. First, the report in several places refers to a “clear and 
growing trend” towards exceptions to immunity,126 but it neither provides any empirical 
assessment as to the existence of a “trend” nor indicates a time period (such as over the past ten 
years) for such a trend. Indeed, the evidence marshaled in the report does not signal any 
particular arc in the development of exceptions or limitations; support for the draft article is 
derived indiscriminately from different time periods: the 1950 Nuremberg Principles;
127
 the 
Eichmann trial in the 1960s;
128
 the 1976 U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act;
129
 the Barbie 
trial in the 1980s;
130
 the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals in the 1990s;
131
 and the adoption of 
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recent national legislation on international crimes.
132
 These various fragments of information do 
not appear to establish either a “clear” or “growing” trend in the law. Moreover, some evidence 
seems to suggest either the lack of a trend, for example in recent cases at the International Court 
of Justice
133
 and before the European Court of Human Rights,
134
 or perhaps a countertrend in the 
sense of narrowing the scope of national laws.
135
 Arguably, the repeated emphasis on a “trend” 
in the fifth report is an implicit acknowledgment by the special rapporteur that settled law on this 
issue may not support the proposed limitations and exceptions and therefore that whatever the 
Commission says on this matter would fall within the realm of progressive development of the 
law. 
 
 Second, the report seems to downplay the lack of consensus among states as to the 
existence of limitations and exceptions as a matter of either lex lata or lex ferenda. The report 
acknowledges at paragraph 20(a) that “there is no clear consensus among States as to which 
questions concerning exceptions would be included in each of the two categories [lex lata or lex 
ferenda].”136 Yet the report then does not take account of that significant observation when 
considering whether state practice and opinio juris support the existence, under present law, of a 
rule on exceptions to immunity.
137
 
 
 Third, the report discusses
138
 but ultimately abandons any effort to distinguish among 
certain very different situations: 
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Fifth Report on Immunity of State Officials, supra note 117, at 29, para. 54. To the extent that such a law is relevant, 
the law was scaled back considerably from its origins so that “Belgian courts . . . only have jurisdiction over 
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exercise jurisdiction over the case.” Human Rights Watch, Belgium: Universal Jurisdiction Law Repealed (Aug. 1, 
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• situations where there is what the special rapporteur calls a “limitation” on immunity 
(that is, the act at issue is not an “official” act and therefore the question of immunity 
ratione materiae simply does not arise); 
 
• situations where there is an “exception” to immunity (for example, the act at issue is 
official, but is so heinous that immunity is denied); and 
 
• situations where immunity is being denied based on some other theory (for example, to 
help ensure compensation for victims). 
 
Instead, all these situations are grouped together, making it difficult to know the ground on 
which the components of draft Article 7 are based. For example, the best justification for the 
absence of immunity for the crime of corruption may be that a corrupt act, by its nature, is for 
private gain and hence not an official act, and therefore the issue of immunity does not arise. If 
so, grouping a corrupt act with other kinds of acts may create confusion, rather than clarity. 
  
Fourth, the report finds great relevance in precedents arising in the area of immunity of 
states from civil jurisdiction whenever they support the proposed draft Article 7
139
 but seems to 
downplay such precedents when they are not helpful.
140
 For example, the report cites to certain 
civil cases under national law that purportedly establish exceptions to immunity so as to support 
a proposition that such exceptions also exist with respect to that state’s criminal law.141 But when 
it comes to considering international case law, such as cases before the European Court of 
Human Rights, where exceptions to immunity are rejected in the context of civil cases, those 
precedents are deemed by the report to be of no great significance because they concern civil and 
not criminal matters.
142
  
 
Fifth, and likewise, the report leans on treaty practice when it supports proposed draft 
Article 7 but sets it aside when such treaty practice is not supportive.
143
 For example, the report 
concludes that the “territorial tort” exception that exists in treaties addressing immunity of states 
from civil jurisdiction supports an analogous exception in the context of criminal jurisdiction; 
such treaties include the 2004 UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their 
Property
144
 and the 1972 European Convention on State Immunity.
145
 Yet if those treaties are 
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 Id. at 83–86, paras. 206–14 (e.g., access of victims to remedies). 
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 Ultimately, the report concludes that exceptions to one regime cannot be transposed onto the other. Id. at 66, 
para. 155. But see HAZEL FOX & PHILIPPA WEBB, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 85 (3d ed. 2013) (“Civil 
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 Fifth Report on Immunity of State Officials, supra note 117, at 51–53, paras. 116–20. 
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 Id. at 39–42, paras. 87–95. 
143
 Id. at 17–24, paras. 23–41. 
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 Id. at 18–19, paras. 26–27 (citing in part United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and 
Their Property, GA Res. 59/38, annex (Dec. 2, 2004)). 
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relevant in support of an analogous exception to immunity from criminal jurisdiction, then they 
presumably should be equally relevant with respect to the absence of any exception in those 
treaties relating to genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, torture, enforced 
disappearance, or corruption. In other words, if states in those treaties (and in their national laws 
on immunity of states) did not include exceptions to state immunity for an allegation of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and so on, then that, too, would appear directly 
pertinent to whether any such exception exists with respect to criminal jurisdiction. Indeed, given 
that the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property was adopted 
in 2004 without any such exceptions of this kind, this fact does not fit within the asserted 
narrative of a “trend” towards limitations and exceptions. 
 
 Perhaps more importantly, widely adhered-to treaties expressly addressing immunity for 
certain categories of state officials in the context of allegations of criminal conduct also contain 
no such exceptions. As the report acknowledges, treaties directly governing immunity of state 
officials, such as diplomats and consular officials, “do not contain provisions contemplating any 
form of exception or limitation to immunity as regards criminal jurisdiction.”146 Thus, in the 
Vienna Conventions relating to diplomats and consular officials,
147
 which have been adhered to 
by 190 and 179 states respectively, there is no exception to immunity relating to genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and so on. Yet the report does not consider the significance 
of the lack of such exceptions in treaties that states, by all accounts, continue to regard as entirely 
acceptable. Rather, the report downgrades these treaties as “mainly describ[ing] a model of 
immunity ratione personae” though, as the report itself ultimately concedes, they also concern 
immunity ratione materiae.
148
 Indeed, for acts performed by such a person in the exercise of his 
or her diplomatic or consular functions, immunity continues to subsist even after those functions 
have come to an end.  
  
 Likewise, treaties that specifically address the crime of genocide, war crimes, enforced 
disappearance, and apartheid do not, at least expressly, deny immunity to state officials. The 
report asserts that Article IV of the Genocide Convention “indirectly postulates the irrelevance of 
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 Id. at 19, para. 28 (citing in part European Convention on State Immunity, May 16, 1972, ETS No. 74, 1495 
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 Fifth Report on Immunity of State Officials, supra note 117, at 17–18, para. 24. The Commission’s topic does 
not address immunities that exist under “special rules of international law,” such as those on the immunity of 
diplomats and consular officials. As noted in the fifth report, draft Article 1, paragraph 2, provides: “The present 
draft articles are without prejudice to the immunity from criminal jurisdiction enjoyed under special rules of 
international law, in particular by persons connected with diplomatic missions, consular posts, special missions, 
international organizations and military forces of a State.” Id. at 96 (Annex I). 
147
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official status,”149 but many view that language as speaking only to the criminal responsibility of 
the individual and not to his or her immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction.
150
 In any event, 
the report could have noted that Article VI of the Genocide Convention limits the obligation to 
prosecute alleged offenders to the state in whose territory the genocide allegedly occurred or by 
an international criminal tribunal, which means that if immunity is impliedly being denied, it is 
only in that narrower context. Likewise, conventions on corruption contain no provisions 
expressly denying immunity to foreign government officials, though they do contain provisions 
relating to the immunity of government officials within their own state.
151
 If there was, in fact, a 
“trend” to deny immunity to state officials in foreign jurisdictions for enforced disappearance, 
for example, it might have been expected that the drafters of the relatively recent International 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance
152—adopted in 
2006—would have included a provision to that effect. Yet they did not do so.153 
 
Implicit waiver of the immunity of a state official in such treaties is far from certain,
154
 
but perhaps it can be found when the crime is so defined that it may only be committed by state 
officials—such as in the Convention Against Torture—and every state party has an obligation to 
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 Id. at 21, para. 33 (citing Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Art. 4, Dec. 9, 
1948, 78 UNTS 277 (“Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be 
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 The same is true of the report’s discussion of the Commission’s 1996 Draft Code of Crimes, which indicated the 
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 Id. at 23–24, paras. 37–41. For example, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption provides in part: 
 
 Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish or maintain . . . an 
appropriate balance between any immunities or jurisdictional privileges accorded to its public officials for 
the performance of their functions and the possibility, when necessary, of effectively investigating, 
prosecuting and adjudicating offences established in accordance with this Convention. 
 
UN Convention Against Corruption, Art. 30(2), Oct. 31, 2003, 2349 UNTS 41 (emphasis added). 
152
 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, Dec. 20, 2006, 2716 
UNTS 3 [hereinafter Enforced Disappearance Convention]. 
153
 An initial draft of the Enforced Disappearance Convention contained an article explicitly excluding immunity of 
state officials other than diplomats. See Draft International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/19, annex, Art. 10(2) (Aug. 19, 1998) (“No privileges, 
immunities or special exemptions shall be granted in such trials, subject to the provisions of the Vienna Convention 
on Diplomatic Relations.”). States decided to drop that article in the final version of the Convention. The 
Convention does address immunities but only in the context of granting them to the members of that treaty’s 
committee of experts. See Enforced Disappearance Convention, supra note 153, Art. 26(8). 
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 See Arrest Warrant, supra note 133, para. 59 (“[A]lthough various international conventions on the prevention 
and punishment of certain serious crimes impose on States obligations of prosecution or extradition, thereby 
requiring them to extend their criminal jurisdiction, such extension of jurisdiction in no way affects immunities 
under customary international law . . . .”). 
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exercise jurisdiction over any alleged offender who turns up in its territory.
155
 In such 
circumstances, the idea of an implied waiver may be at its strongest. Even so, it would be purely 
a treaty-based exception to immunity, essentially predicated on a waiver when the official’s state 
joins the treaty, and would only operate when the offender is present in the forum state. Further, 
the International Court of Justice’s admonition in the ELSI case may be pertinent; the Court 
stated that it was “unable to accept that an important principle of customary international law 
should be held to have been tacitly dispensed with, in absence of any words [in the treaty] 
making clear an intention to do so.”156 Further, if such widely adhered-to treaties in some fashion 
support the exceptions indicated in draft Article 7, why are other exceptions also not suggested 
by similar treaties that have attracted widespread adherence, such as treaties on sexual slavery, 
child prostitution or pornography, trafficking in narcotics, attacks on diplomats, taking of 
hostages, terrorist bombings, or cybercrime? 
 
 Sixth, some concern relates to the use of national legislation to support the proposed 
exceptions in draft Article 7.
157
 As the report notes, “[N]ational laws regulating jurisdictional 
immunity are very few in number,”158 which presents a problem for identifying settled law 
relating to any exceptions. Further, most of these national laws relate to immunity of states, not 
immunity of officials from criminal jurisdiction. Even so, as was the case with treaties on state 
immunity, the report indicates that these national laws on state immunity provide for a 
“territorial tort” exception, which purportedly in turn supports an analogous exception to 
immunity in the context of criminal jurisdiction.. Yet, as was the case with treaties, it should be 
acknowledged that these national laws on state immunity contain no exceptions for genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and so on. As previously noted, if these laws on state 
immunity are relevant to the exceptions for immunity from criminal jurisdiction, then they would 
also appear relevant to the exceptions that they do not contain. 
 
 Likewise, while the report appropriates the “territorial tort” exception in these national 
laws on state immunity in support of an analogous exception to immunity from criminal 
jurisdiction, the report does not address an important aspect of why the former exception 
developed. The origins of the “territorial tort” exception to immunity from civil jurisdiction, to a 
large extent, lie in the idea that it is reasonable for a foreign state to be civilly liable for insurable 
risks. For example, if a state plans to equip its foreign embassy with a fleet of vehicles and 
drivers, then it should take out an automobile insurance policy, so as to address any injuries 
caused in the host state from the negligence of its drivers. But that explanation for the “territorial 
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tort” exception does not easily translate into an exception to immunity for criminal behavior of 
officials.
159
 
 
Moreover, while the report seizes upon the “territorial tort” exception in national laws on 
state immunity, it does not squarely confront that these national laws typically maintain 
immunity of the state for public acts (jure imperii).
160
 The report acknowledges that these laws 
have exceptions for state acts that are essentially commercial or private (jure gestionis)
161
 but 
does not acknowledge the other side of the coin, which is the preservation of immunity for acts 
jure imperii. If the existence of a “territorial tort” exception in such laws is relevant to immunity 
of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, then the retention of immunity for public 
acts, such as military activities in armed conflict,
162
 would seem equally relevant, a point that 
was addressed in the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State case.
163
 
 
 The report also notes several recent national laws implementing the Rome Statute that are 
important when considering whether State practice supports the exceptions to immunity found in 
draft Article 7. Yet, as the fifth report notes, many of those laws are only applicable to the 
surrender of persons to the International Criminal Court and are not broader in nature.
164
 Indeed, 
the report lists just five states with broader implementing statutes.
165
 
 
 Seventh, the report seems to avoid the implications of fairly consistent case law at the 
international level that rejects exceptions to immunity for foreign state officials.
166
 With respect 
to the International Court of Justice, the Arrest Warrant judgment rejected such exceptions, 
albeit in the context of immunity of a sitting foreign minister.
167
 The Jurisdictional Immunities of 
the State judgment also rejected such exceptions, albeit in the context of state immunity.
168
 The 
reasoning of those decisions would seem to cut against the idea of exceptions to immunity for 
state officials based on specific crimes, especially given the Court’s emphasis on the procedural 
nature of immunity, in comparison with the substantive crime alleged (even when the crime 
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entails serious violations of human rights).
169
 Indeed, the Court observed in the Jurisdictional 
Immunities of the State case that “customary international law does not treat a State’s entitlement 
to immunity as dependent upon the gravity of the act of which it is accused or the peremptory 
nature of the rule which it is alleged to have violated.”170 In the same case, the Court observed 
that a logical problem arises with predicating a denial of immunity upon the gravity of the act 
alleged, since, at the time the immunity is denied, no such act has yet been proven.
171
 Such 
observations appear to be influencing civil actions against state officials at the national level.
172
  
 
The Court in the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State case did not address immunity of 
state officials,
173
 but the Court is often cautious in confining itself to the facts and law before it. 
The issue for the Commission concerns the implications of the Court’s judgment, which seem to 
run contrary to the proposed draft Article 7. Likewise, the European Court of Human Rights has 
systematically rejected such exceptions, albeit in the context of civil actions brought on the basis 
of a right of access to a court. These decisions were not unanimous,
174
 and they did not concern 
criminal prosecutions, but they, too, seem to run contrary to the proposed draft Article 7. 
 
The report relies in part on the Blaškić case,175 which was decided in 1997, relatively 
early in the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), and which addressed the ability of the ICTY to subpoena state officials, not the ability 
of a state to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign state official. In fact, international criminal 
tribunals do not seem to have taken a position that exceptions to immunity exist in national 
courts, other than for the purpose of cooperation with the court or tribunal itself.
176
 Indeed, such 
tribunals seem to recognize the difference between the two, sometimes noting that “national 
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 Id. at 43, paras. 99–100. 
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authorities might use prosecutions to unduly impede or limit a foreign state’s ability to engage in 
international action,” whereas such a risk “does not arise with international courts and tribunals, 
which are ‘totally independent of states and subject to strict rules of impartiality.’”177 
 
 Eighth, the report provides a detailed but ultimately questionable assessment of what is 
happening in the case law at the national level,
178
 at least if the conclusion is that a “majority 
trend is to accept the existence of certain limitations and exceptions to [immunity ratione 
materiae].”179 One problem, as previously noted, is that there is no demonstration of a “trend” 
from one point in time to another. A second problem is that the analysis tends to obscure the 
number of cases at issue. The report appears to identify just eleven cases over the past fifty years 
where a national court denied immunity ratione materiae to a foreign state official in a criminal 
case involving the alleged commission of an international crime.
180
 Of those eleven cases, nine 
were in Europe, one in Israel, and one in Chile. Such evidence is neither “widespread” nor 
“representative,” if the objective is to identify existing customary international law.181 Similarly, 
the report mentions just three cases where a national court purportedly denied immunity ratione 
materiae to a foreign state official in a criminal case involving alleged corruption.
182
 Of those 
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cases, two were in Europe and one in Chile. Given that a comparable number of national court 
cases deny immunity ratione materiae to a foreign state official in a criminal case relating to 
terrorism or sabotage—three in total183—then, on this methodology, the crime of terrorism would 
seem to warrant its own exception in draft Article 7. A third problem is that several cases cited in 
support of an exception for immunity ratione materiae actually involved no prosecution of a 
state official, such Germany’s In re Hussein case,184 or were set aside by a higher court, such as 
the Netherlands’ Bouterse case.185 A final problem is the assertion that only a “small number of 
cases” have granted immunity ratione materiae for alleged serious international crimes, when 
many such cases seem to exist, especially if one looks at both criminal and civil cases.
186
 
 
 In any event, what may get lost in the discussion is the report’s own recognition that case 
law on immunity ratione materiae is “less uniform” than case law on immunity ratione 
personae,
187
 meaning that some cases involving immunity ratione materiae uphold immunity, 
while other cases do not. Indeed, the report itself points out that “there are very few national 
court decisions in which immunity was withheld in connection with the commission of any of 
the established international crimes.”188 Further, when the cases are broken down into the 
different categories of crimes—cases withholding immunity ratione materiae for genocide, cases 
withholding such immunity for crimes against humanity, and so on—the numbers look even 
more sparse. 
 
 Finally, though perhaps an insurmountable problem, a thorough methodology would not 
look solely at cases that have worked their way into the national court system but would also 
examine whether and why national prosecutors have not pursued prosecutions in the first place. 
Situations where such prosecutors do not pursue a criminal case due to a belief of immunity, 
which may occur with considerable frequency, simply do not turn up by analyzing the case law. 
 
 The debate at the sixty-ninth session may ultimately lead to the adoption by the 
Commission of a draft article for this topic on limitations and exceptions; if so, such a draft 
article likely will reflect an effort at progressive development of the law. The special rapporteur 
has indicated a desire to submit a sixth report at that session on procedural aspects of immunity 
of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction,
189
 which may assist in addressing concerns 
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about opening the door to politically motivated investigations and prosecutions of foreign state 
officials. 
 
Provisional Application of Treaties 
 
 The Commission considered the fourth report on the provisional application of treaties by 
the special rapporteur, Juan Manuel Gómez-Robledo (Mexico), which proposed one further draft 
guideline for this topic, draft Guideline 10, on the relationship of internal law to the provisional 
application of a treaty.
190
 After debate in the plenary, the proposed guideline was sent to the 
drafting committee,
191
 which already had several guidelines before it from the prior session that 
had not yet been provisionally adopted.
192
 
 
At present, none of the draft guidelines (with commentary) has been adopted by the 
Commission. The first three draft guidelines were provisionally adopted in the drafting 
committee in the sixty-seventh session.
193
 An additional five draft guidelines—draft Guidelines 
4, 6, 7, 8, and 9—were provisionally adopted in the drafting committee during the sixty-eighth 
session and state as follows: 
 
Draft guideline 4 
Form 
 
In addition to the case where the treaty so provides, the provisional application of 
a treaty or part of a treaty may be agreed through: 
 
(a) a separate agreement; or 
 
(b) any other means or arrangements, including a resolution adopted by an 
international organization or at an intergovernmental conference. 
 
Draft guideline 6 
Commencement of provisional application 
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The provisional application of a treaty or a part of a treaty, pending its entry into 
force between the States or international organizations concerned, takes effect on such 
date, and in accordance with such conditions and procedures, as the treaty provides or as 
are otherwise agreed. 
 
Draft guideline 7  
Legal effects of provisional application 
 
The provisional application of a treaty or a part of a treaty produces the same 
legal effects as if the treaty were in force between the States or international 
organizations concerned, unless the treaty provides otherwise or it is otherwise agreed. 
 
Draft guideline 8 
Responsibility for breach 
 
The breach of an obligation arising under a treaty or a part of a treaty that is 
provisionally applied entails international responsibility in accordance with the applicable 
rules of international law. 
 
Draft guideline 9 
Termination upon notification of intention not to become a party 
 
Unless the treaty otherwise provides or it is otherwise agreed, the provisional 
application of a treaty or a part of a treaty with respect to a State or international 
organization shall be terminated if that State or international organization notifies the 
other States or international organizations between which the treaty or a part of a treaty is 
being applied provisionally of its intention not to become a party to the treaty.
194
 
 
 In addition, as proposed by the special rapporteur, draft Guideline 10 on “Internal law 
and the observation of provisional application of all or part of a treaty,” states:  
 
A State that has consented to undertake obligations by means of the provisional 
application of all or part of a treaty may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as 
justification for non-compliance with such obligations. This rule is without prejudice to 
article 46 of the 1969 Vienna Convention.
195
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This draft guideline has not yet been provisionally adopted by the drafting committee but will be 
addressed (along with draft Guideline 5, which relates to termination of the obligation to apply a 
treaty provisionally) at the next session.  
 When addressing draft Guideline 10, three different scenarios should be considered 
concerning the relationship of internal law to an agreement to apply a treaty provisionally. The 
first scenario relates to an agreement on provisional application that itself makes reference to 
internal law; in such a situation, internal law is relevant for understanding the scope of the 
agreement on provisional application. Such an agreement may be seen in Article 45(1) of the 
Energy Charter Treaty,
196
 which was at issue with respect to the tribunal’s jurisdiction in the 
Yukos arbitration,
197
 and more recently in related national proceedings.
198
 This scenario has no 
connection to the issue of whether a state can plead its internal law so as to escape from an 
international obligation; rather, it concerns the nature of the international obligation itself. 
The second scenario relates an agreement on provisional application that is silent with 
respect to internal law, but a state seeks to argue that its consent to the agreement was invalid 
because of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude international 
agreements. This scenario is analogous to the use of internal law under VCLT Article 46 to 
declare invalid a treaty that is in force.
199
 Of course, the ability of a state to escape from an 
agreement to apply a treaty provisionally by mere notification to the other parties, as permitted 
under VCLT Article 25(2),
200
 usually makes it unnecessary for the state to invoke internal law 
for this purpose. The issue may be relevant, however, if the objective is to establish that the 
agreement was void ab initio, in which case no breach of the agreement could have occurred for 
which reparation is due.
201
 
 
The third scenario relates to an agreement on provisional application that is silent with 
respect to internal law, but a state seeks to invoke its internal law as justification for its failure to 
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perform its international obligations. This scenario is analogous to the use of internal law to 
justify nonperformance of a treaty that is in force; in that situation, VCLT Article 27 provides 
that a “party [to a treaty] may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its 
failure to perform a treaty.”202 Here again, even though mere notification to the other parties 
allows the state to escape from an agreement to apply the treaty provisionally, the issue may be 
relevant if the objective of the state is to establish that no breach based on nonperformance under 
the treaty has occurred for which reparation is due.
203
 
 
IV. ILC ELECTION IN 2016 AND FUTURE WORK 
 
The sixty-eighth session was the last session of the current quinquennium of the 
Commission. A new Commission of thirty-four members will be elected by the UN General 
Assembly on November 3, 2016, to serve from 2017 until 2021. 
 
During the next quinquennium, the Commission may decide to move new topics onto its 
agenda. In that regard, during the sixty-eighth session, the Commission placed two new topics on 
its long-term work program (thus signaling that they might be moved to the active agenda): (1) 
the settlement of international disputes to which international organizations are parties;
204
 and (2) 
succession of states in respect of state responsibility.
205
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